by When Beijing launched Made in China 2025 (MIC2025) in 2015, it represented more than an industrial roadmap—it was a lay‑down for technological sovereignty. With an explicit target to place China among global leaders in ten advanced sectors—from robotics to EVs—and more than US $300 billion in support announced, the policy envisioned 70% domestic content in high‑tech manufacturing by 2025. It formed the centrepiece of China’s ambition to shed its low‑tech “world factory” tag and ascend global value chains. India, by contrast, launched Make in India in 2014 and Atmanirbhar Bharat in 2020, aiming to expand its manufacturing share to 25% of GDP by 2025.
The question today is not whether India must build a manufacturing powerhouse—it must—but whether it can move with the clarity, coordination and commitment China’s plan embodied, while preserving the democratic ethos and market discipline Linux deviates from the MIC2025 script.
The Central Challenge
India’s manufacturing drive is undeniably accelerating—but still lags in depth, structure, and engineering power. Manufacturing contributes roughly 17% of GDP (target 25%) and employs just 11% of the workforce, down from over 12% a decade ago. Despite a decade of Make in India, India remains a net importer of electronics, chemicals, and high‑end machinery. R&D investment remains stuck at 0.7% of GDP, compared to China’s over 2.4% in 2023. Skills deficiency is acute: only about 5% of India’s workforce is formally trained, versus nearly 25% in China.
Meanwhile, India’s share of global manufacturing output is a mere 2.9%, overshadowed by China’s 31.6%, the USA’s 15.9%, Japan’s 6.5%, and Germany’s 4.8%
Snapshot: India’s Current Numbers
| Indicator | India (Current) | China / MIC2025 Benchmark |
|---|---|---|
| GDP share – Manufacturing | ~17% (below 25% target) | ~29% as part of 36% industry share |
| Global manufacturing share | ~2.9% | ~31.6% |
| R&D spending | ~0.7% of GDP | ~2.4% for China (2023) |
| Skilled workforce | ~5% formally trained | ~25% |
| FDI inflow – last 10 yrs | USD 165 billion (+69%) | – |
| PLI schemes (output-to-Aug 2024) | ₹10.9 lakh cr output, 8.5 lakh jobs, ₹1.32 lakh cr investment | – |
| Jobs from PLI (by Mar 2025) | Over 12 lakh jobs, production ₹16.5 lakh cr | – |
| Mobile exports 2023‑24 | USD 15.6 billion (largest supplier to US) | China dominance collapsing |
What India Can Learn from MIC2025
- Strategic Vision with Anchored Targets
Unlike India’s loosely coordinated Make in India, China’s MIC2025 offered sectoral milestones—70% domestic content, lead patents in EV batteries, and world‑class robotics by 2025. India needs a National Industrial Strategy 2030, with clear annual sectoral targets (e.g. semiconductor capacity, value-added steel, defence electronics) and penalty/reward structures. - Fund R&D and Self‑Reliance
MIC2025 enabled state‑funded labs, grants for joint ventures, and subsidies tied to local content. Today only 1 in 10 (0.9%) of India’s firms conduct any R&D. A scaled “Manufacturing Innovation Corps” and labs-for-hire near industrial clusters can increase corporate R&D, allied with tax credits for patents developed domestically. - Integrated Supply Chains at Regional Hubs
China’s provinces were organized into vertically integrated industrial corridors—automotive in Changchun, semiconductors in Jiangsu. India’s clusters remain fragmented. If we direct PLI funding towards plug-and-play mega-parks with anchor tenants (e.g. auto OEMs, chip fabs, specialty chemical plants) and cascade supply chain obligations onto MSMEs, investment will localize value. - Skilling and Women Participation
China mobilised industrial schools and technical certifications. India’s Skill India reached only 5% of workforce; 75% lack AI or automation training. Gender inclusion is also critical: MeitY’s secretary warned recently that India cannot reach 25% (manufacturing‑GDP) without doubling women’s participation. Skills must be reskilled with women-friendly labs, night double kitchens, linked to cluster locales. - Policy Consistency and Long-Term Incentives
MIC2025 lasted through two five-year plans, insulated from Cabinet churn. India’s PLI is expiring by 2026, and newer schemes risk fragmentation or dilution. India needs manufacturing legislation—National Industrial Strategy Act—that ensures policy frameworks last at least a decade, with binding cross-party consensus and binding centre‑state bifurcation of duties.
Policy Roadmap: The Way Forward
- Launch “Manufacturing India 2030” across five flagship sectors—semiconductors, specialty steel, EV batteries, pharmaceuticals APIs, and defence electronics—with per-sector targets for domestic content, value-add and export share.
- Scale R&D incentives: triple tax credit on manufacturing‑linked patents, create Industry-Academia Hub Zones (IAHZ) within 10 industrial corridors, matched by state governments.
- Cluster-Based Apparatus: incentivize captive power, waste-water recycling, logistics parks and common facilities to reduce unit costs; integrate MSMEs with large OEMs through backward credit links.
- Massive Skilling Push with “Women@Work India” scheme: apprenticeships reserved for women in advanced domains; tie cluster license benefits to diversity in workforce.
- Extend PLI for decade-long horizons, shift from capex reimbursement to performance-oriented value-add linkage; ensure faster disbursements; link component manufacturing and R&D to future consessions.
- Greenfield semiconductor and EV hubs: remove policies that cancel refunds after sunset (
Made in Indiapast failures). The HCL–Foxconn fab in Noida is a first step; embed cluster around it with copper foil, ACC lines, and magnet plants. - Trade and IP Integration: negotiate industry-specific clauses in trade agreements to prevent cheapest dumping; fast-track standard‑certification (RoHS, UL, CE) labs for Indian clusters; build export‑oriented zones like zones in Shenzhen.
Conclusion
India’s rise in manufacturing cannot remain episodic or habitual—truthfully, it’s at an inflection point. On one side is the path of aspiration without structure; on the other, the disciplined, well-resourced execution exemplified by MIC2025.
Yet India must tailor its approach to democratic principles: private ownership, rights-based labour, transparent incentives, and multi-party policy longevity. If India aligns its market strength (base demand, demographic dividend, FDI potential) with a rule‑based, charted industrial policy—anchored in tech-intensive sectors—then the “Make in India 2030” strategy can truly emulate and exceed the progress China has made under MIC2025.
It’s not just another policy reset—it’s a strategic moment for India to jump into the next league, with sovereignty of supply chains, inclusive development, and democratic accountability intact.
